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ABSTRACT
In 2013 the authoritarian Chinese Communist Party adopted a nationwide
policy to contract out welfare services to social organizations. This presented
the Party/state with a conundrum: how best to foster service-oriented so-
cial organizations whilst retaining control over politically sensitive groups.
Using a Foucauldian framework of analysis, this article explores the ratio-
nalities and technologies of statecraft deployed to navigate this tension. It
argues that contracting welfare services is a form of governmentality linked
to economic efficiency, welfare provision and social stability, requiring sub-
tle ways of governing society. In implementing this policy, the Party/state
seeks to foster a service-oriented civil society and stymie rights-based and
politically sensitive groups.
INTRODUCTION
In 2013 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rolled out a nationwide pro-
gramme of contracting welfare services to social organizations.1 This re-
quired modifying the restrictive regulatory framework governing social
We are grateful to the ESRC ES/P001726/ for supporting this research. We also acknowledge
with thanks the constructive comments of several anonymous referees on an earlier version of
this article.
1. In this article, we use the term ‘social organizations’ (shehui zuzhi), which is more cur-
rent in Chinese than the English ‘NGOs’. The administrative term ‘social organizations’
refers to organizations such as foundations, social groups and people’s not-for-profit en-
terprises registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA). In this article, the term is
used sociologically to describe the associational landscape of registered and unregistered
NGOs, with varying degrees of autonomy and relations with government, including grass-
roots organizations and government-organized NGOs (GONGOs). The terms in Chinese to
describe NGOs are often used interchangeably and change over time in administrative regu-
lations, academically and in everyday discourse. For example, in registration regulations of
2016 governing social organizations, MOCA replaced ‘people’s non-profit enterprise’ with
‘social service organization’.
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organizations to facilitate registration and enable applications for gov-
ernment contracts. Given that the Party/state had hitherto viewed so-
cial organizations with ambivalence, sometimes tolerating their existence
when deemed instrumentally useful but sometimes harassing those per-
ceived as threatening, this was a significant change of approach. How-
ever, it presented the Party/state with a challenge: how to foster service-
oriented social organizations, whilst keeping at bay rights-oriented and
politically sensitive groups. Given the Party/state’s ongoing suspicion
and frequent repression of social organizations, this volte-face would
also need some justification if social organizations were to trust the
government and the public were to accept this new type of service
provider. Furthermore, it would require the Party/state to leverage tech-
nologies of statecraft to ensure both the expansion of service-oriented so-
cial organizations and control over rights-based, advocacy-oriented social
organizations.
This article adopts a Foucauldian framework to explore the rationalities
and technologies of statecraft that the Party/state adopted to manage these
challenges.2 We argue that contracting welfare services to social organiza-
tions is not merely a technical solution to pluralizing the range of service
providers but also a form of governmentality linked to broader goals of
economic efficiency, welfare provision and social stability, requiring sub-
tle ways of governing society. Deploying modified and new technologies
of statecraft, the Party/state seeks to foster a service-oriented civil society
and to stymie rights-based and politically sensitive groups, which have often
proved adept at manoeuvring around controls.
The article begins by outlining the theoretical framework and explaining
the key concepts: governmentality, political rationalities and technologies
of statecraft. It then sketches the meta-rationality of hybrid socialism-
neoliberalism that encompasses the rationalities of public sector reform,
social governance and the pluralization of welfare used to legitimize the
contracting of welfare services to social organizations. The subsequent
section then examines the key technologies of statecraft used to facilitate
this policy shift without risking social instability and regime threat. These
are: first, changes in the regulatory environment to encourage and simul-
taneously discourage certain types of social organizations; second, social
work practice that focuses on individuals and legitimizes social workers;
third, the use of lists as techniques of exclusion and inclusion that shape the
matrix of legitimate service-providers; fourth, devices that distinguish needs
and services from rights and activism; and fifth, Party cells as techniques of
2. In adopting a Foucauldian analysis of power, the article acknowledges that power cannot be
merely reduced to visible intent, but rather is subtly embodied in discursive shifts, institu-
tional strategies and practices.
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surveillance and control. Our goal is neither to assess the effectiveness of
these technologies nor to investigate in depth the varied empirical process
of policy implementation,3 but rather to understand the shifting contours of
governance in China.
The article draws upon an analysis of policies, laws and speeches of
leaders related to welfare-services contracting over the past two decades.
It forms part of a larger project funded by the UK’s Economic and So-
cial Research Council on the politics of contracting welfare services to
NGOs in China. The research involved an extensive review of relevant
Chinese and English literature, alongside an analysis of relevant policies,
laws and regulations at central level and, where available, at local level,
from 1998 to 2020. It is supplemented with findings from fieldwork con-
ducted during 2018 and 2019 in four locations (A, B, C, D) and across
three sectors. The four locations had varying contracting histories and tra-
jectories, including former experimental sites for contracting and a city
new to contracting, with few social organizations. The three sectors were
HIV/AIDs, children with disabilities and migrant groups; they represented
marginalized interests less covered in the literature, enabling us to cap-
ture issues around rights and advocacy work in an increasingly repres-
sive political context. Altogether 121 interviews of between one and three
hours were conducted with 84 NGOs, 29 academics and experts (includ-
ing 14 based in Hong Kong) and eight government officials. Where per-
mission was granted, the interviews were recorded and transcribed. The
names of informants remain anonymous to protect interviewees. Organi-
zations were sampled using various sources such as handbooks of NGOs,
websites and personal networks, lists of contracting programmes, contacts
with government officials and stakeholders and snowballing techniques. In
analysing the policies, laws and speeches and relevant fieldwork, we de-
veloped thematic codes such as NGO–state relations, lists, autonomy, Party
cells’ contracting processes, and social work. The interview data were tri-
angulated with relevant sources such as sectoral and locational studies,
policies and websites. All translations into English are provided by the
authors.4
3. It is well established in China studies that there is considerable variation across time and
place and across levels of the Party/state in policy implementation processes (see, for ex-
ample, Hsu et al., 2017). At different levels and divisions of the Party/state, officials face
different economic, historical and cultural circumstances, juggle often competing and in-
creasingly varied interests, operate with hidden rules, and engage with varying degrees of
caution and tolerance with non-state actors. The Party/state is thus not wholly monolithic.
Our empirical findings on the contracting of welfare services to social organizations in dif-
ferent sectors and locations are pursued in greater depth in forthcoming publications.
4. In the References list, the titles of some Chinese articles have been translated into English
by the journal in which they are published. These have not been altered.
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GOVERNMENTALITY, SOCIAL ORDER AND WELFARISM
In understanding the politics of welfare provision through contracting out to
social organizations in urban China, Foucault’s seminal work on power and
governmentality offers a treasure trove of concepts and tools. In particular,
Foucault’s concepts of governmentality, political rationalities and technolo-
gies of power are useful for capturing some of the processes by which states
in general, and China in particular, rule (Dean, 2010). For Foucault, gov-
ernmentality comprises the networks between political authorities and other
authorities such as economic, technical or medical that seek ‘to govern the
lives of others’ through various programmes and plans according to concep-
tualizations of the ‘good, healthy, normal, virtuous, efficient or profitable’
(Rose and Miller, 1992: 175). Foucault’s approach to knowledge, discourse
and expertise as sources of power that create truths and produce rationalities
for certain practices and policy choices transcends linear accounts of policy
processes (Foucault, 1991: 175–76).
In their discussion of the ‘problematics of government’, Rose and Miller
(1992: 175) analyse governmentality through political rationalities and gov-
ernmental technologies. Political rationalities refer to how power is discur-
sively conceptualized and morally and rationally justified. Discourses reveal
power through the creation of knowledge and systems of naming, explaining
and defining. As Chambon (1999: 57) puts it; ‘each discursive practice im-
plies a play of prescriptions that designate its exclusions and choices’. Dis-
courses in turn shape the ways of thinking about processes, produce truth
claims and, as Parton (1999: 105–06) notes, ‘make some actions possible
and preclude others’. Discursive practices delimit a field and legitimate cer-
tain activities, practices and processes and not others.
The second aspect raised by Rose and Miller (1992: 183–84) is the tech-
nologies of government deployed to meet grand political, economic and so-
cial objectives. These comprise the various policies (which embody gov-
ernment’s intentions), projects and programmes, the procedures, laws and
regulations, the techniques, documentation and accredited practices through
which relevant designated political and non-political authorities seek to real-
ize governmental goals. They include technical devices such as listing, data
collection, evaluation reports, assessment and standardization processes that
foster certain habits and practices and generate experts and professionals.
Hierarchical surveillance, normalizing judgement and examination are key
elements of a disciplinary power that ensures that political rationalities per-
meate the micro levels of practice (Parton, 1999: 108).
For Foucault, to govern is ‘to structure the possible field of action of oth-
ers’ (Chambon, 1999: 65). How states discipline and regulate the public life
of citizens and their ability to organize collectively is a way of governing
to ensure meta-goals of social order and stability. Setting the boundaries of
public engagement constructs the possible field of action of citizens in pub-
lic life. In this process the governmentalities of social order and welfarism
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can intersect. In Rose and Miller’s (1992) seminal work on welfarism, wel-
fare states govern by harnessing social policy and social work to their ends.
The intersection of these governmentalities of welfarism and social order
structure the possibilities for citizens to engage in the provision of welfare
as volunteers and as organized actors through social organizations. This in-
terplay between the governmentalities of welfarism and of citizen engage-
ment through organized public action form the subject matter of this article.
In the next section we examine how the Chinese Party/state rationalizes the
policy shift towards contracting welfare services to social organizations, the
bodies of knowledge it draws on and the discourses used to express this.
We will show how the Chinese Party/state deploys social policy, social work
and service-oriented social organizations as instrumentalities of governance
that are in turn justified and rationalized by selective knowledge and truth
claims.
RATIONALITIES OF GOVERNANCE IN CHINA
The political rationalities informing governance are embedded in shifting
discursive fields buttressed by bodies of knowledge and moral justifications.
Such rationalities relate to ideas, norms, values and visions of the ideal
society, the appropriate scope of politics and the tasks of different social
entities such as family, individuals, bureaucracy. They articulate justifica-
tions for government action to achieve broad meta-goals such as enhanced
well-being, prosperity, social order and stability, and social justice. Given
the ‘black box’ of policy making in China, minimal reporting on intra-elite
differences or leaders’ personal policy preferences, and limited access to
high-level leaders, analysis of discursive shifts, tropes and subtle twists in
approach evident in speeches, legislation and policy are important indicators
of areas of difference and debate.
Under China’s market reforms since 1978 a meta-political rationality of
hybrid socialism-neoliberalism has developed that combines socialist ratio-
nalities of planning with market rationalities of competition, efficiency, au-
tonomy and choice (Sigley, 2006: 489, 499). This hybrid rationality paved
the way for the application of these principles to the governance of society,
and specifically welfare. In this vein, governing at a distance was to become
crucial in welfare reform. Just as neoliberal ideas of competition, privatiza-
tion, efficiency, individual choice and streamlining of states were shaping
China’s market reforms, they also shaped public sector and welfare reforms
through the field of new public management (NPM) (Andrews and Van de
Walle, 2013; Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Hood, 1991).
Couched within this meta-rationality, three interlinked political rational-
ities were used to justify changes in the governance of welfare and so-
ciety, namely, public sector reform, social governance and the pluraliza-
tion of welfare (see Figure 1), which we explore below. Elements of these
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Figure 1. Political Rationalities and Technologies of Statecraft in China
Regulatory environment governing civil society
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rationalities — such as contracts and arms-length economic governance —
go back to the Deng Xiaoping era (1978–92), whilst changes in the state, en-
terprise and employee relations through insurance-based medical and pen-
sion reforms were galvanized in the Jiang Zemin era (1992–2002). The re-
thinking of state–citizen relations and mixed welfare provision deepened
in the Hu-Wen era (2002–12) and has developed further and more vigor-
ously during the Xi Jinping period. Hu-Wen’s notion of ‘social management’
evolved into ‘social governance’ as Xi Jinping reinforced leadership by the
Party at the centre of all institutions, including non-governmental, whilst so-
cial work, social policy and social organizations became a way of pluralizing
welfare and governing society.
Public Sector Reform (zhengfu gaige)
Changes in the welfare sphere were justified morally and rationally in the
speeches of Party leaders, different levels of government legislation, reg-
ulations and policies and media reportage, through subtle shifts in lan-
guage. Welfare reform required a new relationship between the state and
society that was captured discursively in key tropes such as ‘separation
of government from society’, ‘transferring the functions of government to
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society’, ‘service-oriented government’, ‘competition’ and ‘giving play to
social forces’. These reflected the idea of the state stepping back and, as with
the economy, guiding rather than directly ruling society. This necessitated a
reframing of the approach towards public sector reform. In the Hu-Wen pe-
riod this was articulated in the notion of ‘people-centred’ government; this
then threaded into Xi Jinping’s ‘service-oriented government’ (CCCP and
State Office, 2011), marking a discursive shift from direct control over citi-
zens to governing at a distance through services provision.
These changes called in turn for adjustments in the role of government
officials (Chan, 2018), new institutional arrangements and new agencies
to be involved in the delivery of welfare services. Just as the concept of
the ‘contract’ had come to organize labour markets and agricultural pro-
duction during the Deng period of office, contracts became a tool in pub-
lic sector reform. This began in the Jiang Zemin era with the procurement
of government services, predominantly transport and construction, which
was codified in the new Contract Law of 1992. The contract embodied neo-
liberal principles of competition, efficiency, performance evaluation, cost-
effectiveness and streamlined government (Jia and Su, 2009).
The seeds of welfare contracting were already being sown in the mid-
1990s in Shanghai when the YMCA was contracted to deliver services
(Wang, 2015: 88; Yang et al., 2015). As part of this transfer of functions, the
Pudong government in Shanghai set up incubators for the development of
service-oriented social organizations. The Asian Development Bank pushed
this direction further when in 2005 it sponsored the contracting of poverty
alleviation efforts in Anhui province to non-governmental groups (Jia and
Su, 2009). Parallel to this, central government encouraged experimentation
in government contracting to social organizations, with pilots initiated in
Guangzhou, Beijing, Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2003 onwards. This cul-
minated in the nationwide extension of the contracting of welfare services
to social organizations in 2013, which offered a technical means to transfer
government functions and pluralize the delivery of welfare. With it came
new ways of facilitating individual choice and competition such as provid-
ing welfare recipients with vouchers (Jing and Savas, 2009; Leung and Xu,
2015: 140) and creating competition between welfare service providers for
government contracts. This approach was justified in the Decision on Core
Issues in Deepening Reform announced at the 3rd Session of the 18th Party
Congress, in November 2013, as follows: ‘We will promote government pur-
chases of public services by means of contract and entrustment, and intro-
duce a competition mechanism into general-affairs management services’.5
To this end, ruling at a distance required changes in the relations between
5. Part IV, Article 15 in the ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform’, 12
November 2013. See: https://china.usc.edu/decision-central-committee-communist-party-
china-some-major-issues-concerning-comprehensively
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the state, individuals and organized society and the development of a cadre
of social workers, all justified by the rationality of ‘social governance’.
Social Governance (shehui zhili)
In his speech at the 2013 Party Congress, Xi Jinping coined the term ‘social
governance’ (shehui zhili), replacing the preceding administration’s trope of
‘social management’ (shehui guanli). The idea of ‘social management’ en-
tered political discourse in the Hu-Wen period to rationalize the re-ordering
of urban governance, the changing roles of government and governed, and
governance through social work and social organizations (Howell, 2019; Le-
ung et al., 2012). The term was contested, with policy makers and academics
debating whether social management or social governance should be used,
and whether these terms implied control of society or not (Cohen, 2011;
He, Z.K., 2014). Whilst Jiang Zemin had linked social management to pub-
lic order in his speech of 2 November 2002 at the 16th Party Congress,
Hu Jintao emphasized its role in welfare in a keynote speech at the Party
School in 2011. The rising importance of social management and welfare
were reflected in The Outline of the 12th Five Year Plan, adopted in the 11th
National People’s Congress in March 2011, where a whole section, Part XI,
was dedicated to social management (Howell, 2019: 70).
It was during the Xi Jinping era that the term subtly slid into ‘social gov-
ernance’, expressing more firmly the idea of government control over soci-
ety. The shift was significant in two ways: first, it signalled a deepening of
governance through welfare, social work and social organizations; second,
it enabled the assertion of Party power over and within non-state institu-
tions, including social organizations, as discussed in the subsequent section
on technologies. In his speech at the 3rd Session of the 18th Party Congress
in 2013 Xi Jinping calls for ‘innovation in the governance system’, ‘speed-
ing up of the separation of government from society’ and ‘strengthening
of the management of social organizations and foreign organizations’.6 The
extension of Party cells into social organizations was a key technology for
realizing social governance. Devolving some power and authority to ‘social
forces’ through the ‘socialization’ of welfare was perceived as a potential
risk to social stability. Establishing a firm system of governance at a distance
was vital to ensuring Party leadership over society as government tasks were
transferred to social workers and social organizations.
As social work was a practice to be engaged in at the grassroots level and
involved changes in the state’s relationship with society and the individual,
6. Part XIII, Articles 47 and 48 in the ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening
the Reform’, 12 November 2013. See: https://china.usc.edu/decision-central-committee-
communist-party-china-some-major-issues-concerning-comprehensively
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it also necessitated a restructuring of governance at the lowest level. This
was to be achieved by transforming institutional structures and readjusting
the roles of grassroots officials (Bray, 2006). In this vein, street commit-
tees and neighbourhood committees were recast in the language of ‘com-
munity’, with the new organizational pillars of community centres, volun-
teers and social organizations (ibid.). The new-fangled notion of ‘three clubs
linked’, that started in Shanghai in 2004 and was adopted across the country
by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) from 2013, neatly captured the
interlinking of community, social organizations and social workers (Wang
et al., 2018: 22). Resources were channelled via municipal budgets to com-
munities to recruit additional government officials and professional social
workers.
Just as governing the market at a distance called for entrepreneurialism, so
governing society at a distance required active citizenship at individual and
collective levels (Bray, 2006; Leung and Xu, 2015). In place of docile class-
based masses, social management called for active citizens with responsibil-
ities for their own and society’s development, ready to engage in community
affairs and volunteer services (Cho, 2017; Leung et al., 2012). In this way,
street committee officials could theoretically rule at a distance whilst so-
cial workers and social organizations took on frontline roles in organizing
community activities, working with vulnerable groups and managing social
stresses. In keeping with the meta-rationality of socialism-neoliberalism, so-
cial workers were hired on short-term contracts in the marketplace of wel-
fare, whether recruited directly by government, as in Beijing and Shanghai,
or indirectly through contracting schemes mediated by social organizations,
as in Guangzhou and Shenzhen (Chan, 2018). This restructuring of grass-
roots governance, which began under the Hu-Wen administration and was
extended and deepened under Xi’s office, required new non-state providers
of services. The idea of the ‘pluralization of welfare’ paved the way for local
governments to transfer service delivery to private agencies, both for-profit
and not-for-profit, through the governance tool of contracts.
Pluralization of Welfare (fuli duoyuanhua)
Communities were now the new locus of urban governance, social work-
ers the new agents of social control and welfare provision, and individuals
were to be responsible and participatory citizens. Local community officials
could not directly provide all services; alternative providers were needed.
However, the supply of non-governmental providers was very limited (Yue,
2017). Some local governments tolerated the activities of unregistered so-
cial organizations as they addressed new social needs, worked with marginal
groups and dealt with issues that the state could not easily tackle itself, but
the restrictive regulatory environment and ongoing harassment constrained
their development, scale and effectiveness (Fisher et al., 2012; Xu, 2014:
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39). The state had now to court grassroots groups and nurture their develop-
ment if they were to transfer welfare services functions to social organiza-
tions.
Mixed welfare provision was the answer to sole reliance on the state but
this too had to be justified, given that public awareness and trust of social or-
ganizations was low and government officials were often suspicious of their
activities, especially those with funding from international donors and those
engaged in rights work. Justification of this move required discursive shifts
that emphasized the benefits of social organizations. The notions of ‘plural-
ization’ (duoyuan hua), ‘social forces’ and ‘socialization’ of welfare (shehui
hua), which echoed NPM principles of choice and government streamlining,
were key elements in this justification7 (He, P., 2015: 111; Lei and Walker,
2013: 19–22).
Government purchasing of services was first strategically articulated as
central to deepening government reforms and social governance in the 12th
Five Year Plan during Hu-Wen’s office and was reinforced at the 18th Party
Congress in the Xi administration. Social organizations were conceptualized
as ‘beneficial for the acceleration of the transformation of government func-
tions … and provision of public services’ (State Council, 2014), contributing
towards the development of a ‘service-oriented government’ and public sec-
tor reform more broadly (State Council, 2013). To this end, giving ‘full play
to the market mechanism’ (State Council, 2016a) and ‘using competitive
means’ (State Council, 2016b: Section 4) to transfer government functions
to social organizations embraced NPM principles of competition. The merit
of social organizations was evident in tropes such as giving ‘full play to
their unique advantages’ in meeting people’s needs and ‘their positive role
… in discovering new public service demand’ (State Council, 2016a: Sec-
tions 1.1 and 2.1). As stated in State Council (2016b: 1), social organizations
also formed a cornerstone of the Party’s governance of society: ‘Reform
of the social organization management system … is conducive to consol-
idating and expanding the foundations for governance by the Party’. The
transfer of welfare services to social organizations was further legitimized
through conferences, academic research and international exchange, gener-
ating new journals and research projects and exposing Chinese researchers,
policy makers and practitioners to new concepts such as Third Sector and
civil society. This bolstered the ideological and epistemological legitimation
for a mixed welfare approach involving social organizations.
These three rationalities — public sector reform, social governance and
the pluralization of welfare — have underpinned the readjustment of re-
lations between the state, market, social organizations and individuals at
community level and facilitated the contracting of welfare services to social
organizations. They resonate with principles of NPM such as streamlining
7. See, for example, State Council (2006), in which the government recognized the need to
‘encourage and mobilize social forces’ in the purchasing of services.
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government, choice, efficiency, competition and performance evaluation.
Whilst they have enabled the idea of ruling at a distance, they have not im-
plied the retreat of the state (Sigley, 2006: 497, 503) nor the absence of state
control. The socialist element in the meta-rationality of hybrid socialism-
neoliberalism is important here, not just ideologically but also in terms of
stability and Party control. During the Xi Jinping era not only has the prin-
ciple of Party leadership been further emphasized, but it has been extended
more thoroughly to non-governmental institutions. In this way welfare re-
forms through social policy, social workers and social organizations serve
not only to facilitate public sector reform but also to ensure the continued
control of the state over society. As will be examined in the next section,
technologies of statecraft are the means through which power is exercised
over society to realize governmental goals of welfare and social stability.
TECHNOLOGIES OF STATECRAFT IN CHINA
This section delves into the technologies deployed in the governmental con-
tracting of welfare services to social organizations in order to realize public
sector reform, promote mixed welfare through choice and competition, and
maintain social stability. We focus specifically on the regulatory environ-
ment governing social organizations; the recruitment of social workers; the
use of lists and accredited practices to sift potential providers; techniques
of exclusion and inclusion through lists; and disciplinary techniques of hi-
erarchical control over social organizations.8 We show how these measures
shape the field of legitimate service-delivery providers and craft a vision
of civil society based on needs and professionalism rather than rights and
activism that would be more common in most liberal democratic societies.
Regulatory Environment Governing Civil Society
Regulatory frameworks encompassing specific laws and policies on so-
cial organizations are particular technologies for shaping the development
of civil society. Though market reforms from 1978 onwards opened up
spaces for new forms of non-governmental organizing responsive to chang-
ing needs, the regulatory environment constrained the ability of emerging
social organizations to gain legal status and grow. In particular, Article 3 of
the 1998 Regulations for the Registration and Management of Social Orga-
nizations required the latter to seek the approval of a sponsoring agency.9
8. As Kang and Han (2008) demonstrate, there is a repertoire of ‘graduated controls’ used to
control civil society.
9. 1998 Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations: Article 3,
‘Social organizations should receive the approval and examination of a sponsor organiza-
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Risk-averse government officials often hesitated to back a social organiza-
tion for fear that unforeseen activities might adversely affect their promo-
tion. Other constraining articles included Article 13 which restricted the
number of social organizations in any specific field to one,10 and Article 19
which prevented social organizations from setting up branches across the
country for fear that nationwide networks could pose a threat to the political
regime.11
However, if welfare reforms that transferred government functions to so-
ciety were to be effected, the regulatory framework governing social orga-
nizations had to change. Specifically, the framework had to enable the re-
cruitment of social organizations that were instrumentally useful to the state
in deepening public sector and welfare reforms without undermining so-
cial stability. Whilst the MOCA had pushed since the 1990s for a legitimate
role for social organizations in welfare, security-focused agencies such as
the Ministry of Public Affairs resisted these efforts (Howell, 2019: 68, 72).
Thus existing laws, regulations and policies were adjusted and new ones in-
troduced both to encourage particular types of social organizations and to
discourage unwanted others. We first trace the regulatory changes to enable
the development of social organizations and then examine the move to con-
strain the activities of foreign social organizations.
In the more open Hu-Wen period, adjustments were made to the 1998
Regulations for the Registration and Management of Social Organizations
to exempt certain types of social organizations from the requirement con-
tained in Article 3 to identify a supervisory agency, enabling them to directly
apply for registration to the relevant level of MOCA. Pilot experimentation
with this began in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Shanghai and Beijing from 2003
onwards and was generalized across the country under the Xi leadership in
2013 (Leung and Xu, 2015: 159–67). These regulatory changes rendered
it easier for nascent and non-registered social organizations to register and
bid competitively for government contracts. Given the absence in the former
planned economy of a private sector or autonomous social organizations in-
volved in welfare provision, these changes were crucial to expanding the
supply of social service providers through contracting.
This apparent relaxation of the regulation had differentiating effects. On
the one hand, it promised to create opportunities for the ‘right type’ of
social organization to gain legal status, bid for government contracts and
tion’. See: www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/regulations-on-the-registration-and-
management-of-social-organizations
10. Ibid.: Article 13, ‘There already exists a social organization in the same administrative
district with the same or a similar scope of activity, and there is thus no need to set up an-
other one’. See: www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/regulations-on-the-registration-
and-management-of-social-organizations
11. Ibid.: Article 19, ‘A social organization cannot establish a regional branch of-
fice’. See www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/regulations-on-the-registration-and-
management-of-social-organizations
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potentially expand their funding and client base. On the other hand, it drew
a sharper and politically convenient line between social organizations which
complied with government requirements by focusing on service delivery
and those perceived as suspect by the Party/state. In between was a grey
area where local officials had flexibility to contract to organizations without
full registration.12 This division was further entrenched through the promul-
gation of the Foreign NGOs Law in 2016, effective from January 2017. Prior
to this, Yunnan province had already issued a new regulation in December
2009, effective from January 2010, which required foreign NGOs to register
with the local Civil Affairs Bureau, evoking considerable concern amongst
civil society researchers, foreign NGOs and international organizations.13
The new law made the process of operating in China much more difficult
and burdensome for foreign NGOs (Batke, 2019; Shieh, 2018), not least be-
cause the law required registration with the relevant level of the Ministry of
Public Security rather than MOCA. As an international foundation director
commented, ‘the situation is restrictive and we have to engage more with the
police now’.14 It also limited the type of projects and activities they could
engage in and subjected them to annual government approval and report-
ing. For domestic social organizations that received foreign funds, the new
law dried up a vital source of funding. This was particularly serious for so-
cial organizations working on sensitive issues and adopting a rights-based
approach to their work, which had relied mainly on foreign funding.
Foreign funding from international bilateral and multilateral organiza-
tions, international NGOs and foundations had all played an important role,
particularly after China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2002,
in shaping advocacy and service delivery in various fields such as children’s
services and rights, labour rights, poverty alleviation, HIV/AIDs, gender
and the environment). Foreign funding brought with it exposure to interna-
tional expertise, knowledge and practice as well as rights-based approaches.
Against the background of government suspicion of foreign agencies, which
had intensified following the Colour Revolutions (Howell, 2019: 72), con-
tracting of service delivery to social organizations provided an opportune
device to strengthen regulation of social organizations and limit undesirable
external influence by substituting governmental for foreign funds and, as
Zhu and Chen note (2013: 44), ‘social work for foreign NGOs’.
The drawing of lines between desirable social organizations, such as those
focused on services, and less desirable social organizations became even
sharper with the promulgation of the ‘Notice on Eliminating the Breed-
ing Grounds for Illegal Social Organizations and Cleansing the Ecological
12. For example, in location A the government had a small pot of funds that could be used to
fund social organizations, registered or not, to provide services.
13. The ‘Yunnan Province Interim Regulations Standardizing International NGO Activities’
was a precursor to the 2017 Foreign NGO Law.
14. Interview 85, international foundation director, location C, April 2019.
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Space for Social Organizations’ by the MOCA in March 2021.15 This No-
tice sought to deprive so-called ‘illegal social organizations’ of any means
of survival by outlawing all forms of support to them, whether by the me-
dia, organizations renting venues, or internet enterprises facilitating online
platforms of these organizations. In this way the CCP sought to remove any
spaces, means or possibilities for unregistered social organizations to sur-
vive.
Whilst the 2016 Foreign NGOs Law and the 2021 Notice sought to con-
tain the growth of undesirable social organizations, other regulations, as de-
scribed above, were adjusted to facilitate the expansion of service-focused
social organizations. However, these adjustments in the regulatory regime
have still not sufficed to expand the supply of scaled-up, service-oriented so-
cial organizations. Some unregistered social organizations resist contracting
government welfare services because of concerns for their autonomy, others
hesitate because the registration process is too complicated and some refrain
from contracting because they lack the scale and capacity to be competitive
(Jing, 2018). To further facilitate the development of non-governmental ser-
vice providers, the Ministry of Finance issued Order No. 102 in March 2020
encouraging small-scale grassroots organizations to apply for government
contracts.16 ‘Growing’ a compliant, service-oriented Third Sector of social
organizations as part of a strategy to govern civil society has proved far from
smooth.
Social Work
The rationality of social governance required social policy as a knowledge
base and social work as a practice to be developed in China if social workers
were to be inserted into the fabric of community governance as legitimate
frontline workers. However, this was a new body of knowledge and exper-
tise that had to be nurtured and justified if social work was to be effective
as a new technology of statecraft (Leung and Xu, 2015: 153–59). Although
social work had begun to be taught in Chinese universities from the mid-
1980s, it was only after 2006 that the Party heralded the role of social work
as important in achieving a ‘harmonious society’ and strengthening Party
leadership (ibid.: 156). It then rapidly developed as a field of knowledge
and expertise. As China lacked any experience in social work practice, the
government invited Hong Kong social work academics and practitioners to
15. MOCA, ‘Notice on Eliminating the Breeding Grounds for Illegal Social Organizations and
Cleansing the Ecological Space for Social Organizations’, Document No. 25, March 2021.
See: http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/xw/tzgg/202103/20210300032709.shtml
16. Ministry of Finance, ‘Measures for the Administration of Government Procurement of Ser-
vices (effective)’, Order No. 102, March 2020. See: http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.
aspx?id=32178&lib=law
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assist in galvanizing the field of social work, providing expertise, training
and advice for the mainland.17 As Leung et al. (2012) argue, the thrust of
social work that spread across China centred on individual-based, therapeu-
tic approaches that echoed the liberal values of many welfare states and
focused on people with psychological and behavioural issues.18
These liberalist-humanist features of social work traditions practised in
Hong Kong were more deeply absorbed in the nearby cities of Shenzhen and
Guangzhou, as compared to Beijing and Shanghai, due to the different re-
cruitment systems of social workers (Leung et al., 2012: 1053–54). In south-
ern cities local governments indirectly recruited social workers through con-
tracted schemes mediated by social organizations, whilst in northern cities
social workers were directly recruited by government (ibid.: 1053). Univer-
sities and newly founded social workers’ associations produced textbooks,
manuals and professional codes of conduct, which imbibed the liberal and
humanistic ideas around personal autonomy, the self-governing individual
and ethical values of care and justice that were commonplace in Hong Kong
and liberal countries (ibid.: 1052). Through this came the rapid creation of
a cadre of professional social workers, a dedicated social work association,
and a key technology of urban governance.
As social work was a new concept and practice, both the government and
the Chinese Association of Social Workers (CASW) played a key role in
familiarizing the public with the roles and values of social workers. The As-
sociation’s 2018–19 annual report proudly notes a reference to the field in
Li Keqiang’s 2019 Report on the Work of the Government, and the use of
the term ‘social work’ on four occasions. In 2019 the Association created
a symbol for social work in China in order to ‘build overall social work …
strengthen social work publicity … and promote brand building’ (CASW,
2018). On the 13th international social work day, provinces organized cel-
ebrations around ‘the new journey of dreaming, social workers in action’
(ibid.). Building social work and gaining public trust in social workers was
vital if this was to serve as a technology for governing communities and
ensuring social stability in a rapidly changing society.
As Leung et al. (2012: 1054) suggested, the liberalist-humanist tradition
of social work practice, indirect hiring of social workers through indepen-
dent social organizations, and professional supervision from Hong Kong
posed a potential threat to the ‘manageability of social work as new tech-
nology of government’. For social workers trained in this tradition, actual
practice in the frontline of community governance has created dilemmas
of values and interests. Frontline social workers have to reconcile conflict-
ing expectations around the needs of clients and the demands of commu-
nity officials to be their ‘foot soldiers’ (Chan and Lei, 2017: 1349–53). So-
cial workers trained in notions of empowerment, rights and participation,
17. Interview 66, Professor of Social Work, Hong Kong, March 2019.
18. See State Council (2016b) for the kinds of issues to be addressed.
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particularly in Guangdong province, encounter the grim reality that they
may be required to serve as agents of social order maintenance, there to
deliver government agendas and mediate between the Party/state and citi-
zens. As professional experts they become complicit in the subjectification
of certain categories of society such as the unemployed, migrants and the
new poor, who have to be known, observed, calculated and dealt with to
guarantee stability and social order.
These moves to govern society through social work do not guarantee that
social work can be fully deployed as a technology of statecraft. As power
also produces points of resistance, it is not surprising to find unease amongst
social workers in having to assume government administrative tasks (Guan,
2015; Zhu and Chen, 2013: 50). Social workers might refuse to take these
on, challenge government officials or approach these tasks with reluctance,
risking forfeiting cooperative relations with officials and job contracts (Zhu
and Chen, 2013: 50). Alongside low pay and short-term contracts this has
contributed to the rapid turnover of social workers.19 Furthermore, as Leung
et al. anticipated in 2012, the unmanageability of this technology eventually
led in the Xi era to the closure of undergraduate social work programmes in
several universities in Guangdong province.
Lists as Techniques of Exclusion and Inclusion
In 2013 the Decision at the 18th Central Committee of the CCP endorsed
clearly the position that ‘social organizations should be commissioned to
provide public services’.20 The challenge for the Party/state was how to se-
lect social organizations that could deliver quality services but that would
not pose a risk to political stability if allowed to grow. It is here that hi-
erarchies and lists that normatively position objects entered as devices for
exercising disciplinary power, shaping perceptions and facilitating processes
of inclusion and exclusion. Lists and preferential policies are differentiating
techniques for ordering society, dividing people into groups that are char-
acterized and treated in different ways, and allocating budgetary resources.
They give sustenance and power to particular groups and not others and in
this way carve out the shape of associational life. By delineating which ser-
vice providers can be entrusted with contracting service delivery at national
and provincial levels, the development of social organizations can be deftly
controlled. Those not on the list are then required, as before, to obtain a
19. On low salaries, see Lu and Cai (2018: 49).
20. See Part XIII, Article 48 in the ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform’, 12
November 2013. See: https://china.usc.edu/decision-central-committee-communist-party-
china-some-major-issues-concerning-comprehensively
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supervisory government department to oversee them — a process often so
obstructive that most organizations do not even attempt to register.
In March 2013 the State Council announced four categories of social or-
ganizations, namely, industrial associations, charities, community services
and science and technology associations, that would be exempt from se-
curing a supervisory agency for registration purposes (Howell, 2019: 76).
The Decision at the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Party Committee in
November 2013 reinforced these moves,21 stating that selected organiza-
tions such as charities, philanthropic organizations and community orga-
nizations could apply directly for registration. Though provincial govern-
ments had some leeway in this categorization process, they adhered to the
overall direction of service orientation. The government created a digital
platform recording every registered social organization, including particu-
lars about their legal person, registered capital and assessment trajectory, a
procedure that makes visible legitimated organizations and facilitates infor-
mation gathering, monitoring and control.
Winners here tended to be GONGOs such as Party-affiliated organizations
like the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF); quasi-governmental orga-
nizations; established service-focused organizations with professional staff,
volunteers, scale, reputation and good government connections; and new so-
cial organizations often established purposively by government departments
to obtain contracts.22 Furthermore, GONGOs often served as hub organiza-
tions, coordinating and evaluating contract applications, organizing capacity
building, and often competing simultaneously for funding (Zhao et al., 2016:
2243–44).23 Smaller grassroots organizations tended not even to apply for
contracts or, if they did, were rarely successful. Indeed, the very term ‘pro-
fessional’ (zhuanye hua) was a convenient discursive trope to distinguish
desirable and undesirable social organizations and was one of four elements
of social governance outlined in Xi Jinping’s speech in relation to social gov-
ernance at the 18th Party Congress.24 It is sufficiently vague and widespread
that it subtly justifies governance over social organizations, functioning as
a sorting device. At its most basic level it referred to qualified social work-
ers and signalled the importance of quality in service delivery. However,
in practice a minority of organizations could meet the criteria, hence the
21. Ibid.
22. These findings corroborate those of Zhao et al. (2016).
23. Interview 89, director, women’s organization, location B, June 2019; Interview 5, Head of
Social Work Office of Civil Affairs Bureau, location D, October 2017; Interview 89, senior
staff member of hub organization, location B, June 2016.
24. These four elements were socialization of welfare, use of law, digitization and profes-
sionalization (shehuihua, zhizhuhua, zhinenghua, zhuanyehua). See Part XIII, Articles 47
and 48 in the ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on
Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform’, 12 Novem-
ber 2013. See: https://china.usc.edu/decision-central-committee-communist-party-china-
some-major-issues-concerning-comprehensively
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recruitment of more established organizations to provide capacity building
to develop the sector (Zhao et al., 2016). Further differentiation came with
the specification of certain categories of social organizations according to
assessment criteria. For example, the MOCA (2010: Document 39, Article
28) stipulates that ‘organizations that acquire a level 3A and above can be
given priority to … receive government purchasing of services’, the assess-
ment being carried out by relevant government departments.25
Whilst these lists endorse certain types of social organizations, they are
juxtaposed by so-called ‘blacklists’ of groups that the government considers
suspicious.26 For example, in State Council (2016b: Section 3.6), it is stated
that ‘Civil affairs departments will … establish databases of social organi-
zations which present with suspect behaviour and blacklists’. The lists allow
local officials discretion in deciding which groups to contract. In the current
tight political context, local officials are more conservatively disposed and
unwilling to take risks.
Given the limited sources of funding available to social organizations in
the wake of the 2016 Foreign NGO Law, and other constraints on fundrais-
ing, it becomes difficult politically and operationally for social organizations
to continue any rights work. Our fieldwork yielded several examples of so-
cial organizations that had either closed because of the inability to iden-
tify alternative funding, including government contracts, or had abandoned
their rights work in order to survive. This is not to say that organizations do
not find ways around this, such as continuing rights work discreetly.27 Nev-
ertheless, it remains hard to advocate, mobilize and grow. Governmental
contracting becomes a device through which the Party/state can not only in-
strumentalize social organizations for community engagement and welfare
reform but also tame and control civil society.
Needs and Services versus Rights and Activism
Discourses shaping the purpose of social organizations in government con-
tracts subtly project the power of the Party over society. Specifically, the em-
phasis on service provision as defined through clients’ interests and needs
rather than rights provides the steer to social workers and social organiza-
tions about their legitimate role. In response to the central government’s
2013 directive to contract welfare services to social organizations (State
Council, 2013: 3.3; also State Council, 2014: Document 96, Article 16),
25. In Guangdong, Fujian and Beijing assessment is carried out by academic and non-profit
organizations (Chen, 2013).
26. Interview 77, academic, and Interview 78, social worker, location C, April 2019.
27. Interview 82, NGO, location D, April 2019; Interview 99, NGO director, location D, June
2019; Interview 54, NGO director, location B, December 2018; Interview 84, NGO director,
location B, December 2018.
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local governments were required to compile lists of eligible services within
the broad framework devised by central government. The lists that are sent
down from central government are not devised through processes of con-
sultation at the grassroots level. Nevertheless, provincial and county gov-
ernments have leeway to put forward other needs and services that can be
covered by government contracting. However, issues perceived as sensitive
such as HIV/AIDS, migrant workers or rights-based work may lead risk-
averse officials concerned about promotion prospects to hesitate in allocat-
ing government resources to these groups.
Whilst basic services such as elderly care are a key focus in services
contracting, marginalized interests are left to the discretion of local offi-
cials. The power of lists and accompanying budgets emerges when choices
are made in allocating resources. According to the Guiding Opinions (State
Council, 2013: 3.3; State Council, 2014: Document 96, Article 15), the rel-
evant government department issues a list of services open for contracting
that is then used in allocating resources. Marginalized interests around sex-
uality, HIV/AIDS, certain disabilities and migrants often do not appear on
such lists and lack a budgetary allocation. This may be because services for
these groups are neither the responsibility of any department nor seen as
basic services.28 Nevertheless, the policy contradicts other government pro-
nouncements that extol the advantages of social organizations in identifying
new needs (State Council, 2016a: 54, Sections 1.1 and 2.1). The inclusion of
marginal interests calls for advocacy, empowerment, representation of inter-
ests and the recognition of rights. However, in an authoritarian state such as
China the room for advocating around alternative needs is limited, because
of the constraints on citizens’ organizing and limitations on campaigning,
as well as censorship and media restrictions.
As described above, the categories of social organizations that become
eligible for government contracts divide welfare-type social organizations
into those providing services and those that focus on rights. In this way
the Party/state reveals its normative imagination of civil society and fash-
ions it to this end. The role of the Party/state in welfare centres on needs
of individuals, encouraging them through social insurance and controlled
participation to share mutual risks and take responsibility for their own
well-being. This is not about meeting claims for rights or empowering citi-
zens to identify problems or codetermine priorities and solutions. It is about
needs versus rights, person-centred development versus collective solidar-
ity (Leung et al., 2012: 1049), professional services versus activism, and
service-delivery social organizations versus rights-based groups. Lists are
the power device deployed to order needs and social organizations accord-
ing to a broader imagination of associational life in authoritarian China.
28. Interview 76, social work academic, location C, April 2019.
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Party Cells
Contracting government services to social organizations assists the govern-
ment in facilitating public sector reform and in filling the service-provider
gap. However, from the perspective of the Party/state, encouraging the de-
velopment of a Third Sector also runs the risk of emboldening organiza-
tions to promote rights, critique policy and potentially challenge the regime.
Whilst the technologies of regulations, lists and assessment facilitate the
growth of service-oriented social organizations, the Party/state constantly
needs to maintain control lest these organizations slip into rights work and
advocacy. It is here that Party strengthening comes to play a disciplinary
role in potentially checking the development of social organizations. In the
late Hu-Wen era, a directive was issued requiring social organizations to es-
tablish Party cells. This was not stringently enforced at the time and most
non-governmental groups were in any case not registered. Though Party
strengthening was not new, its application to non-state institutions as a tech-
nology of statecraft was (Leung et al., 2012: 1049; Thornton, 2013).
During the Xi administration, as part of a more general policy of strength-
ening Party organizations29 and a fervent anti-corruption campaign, Party
cells have been extended with renewed vigour to non-state institutions,
broadening the capillary-like reach of the Chinese Communist Party as a
device of surveillance and control. To enforce this, a swathe of policy docu-
ments followed requiring social organizations seeking government contracts
to establish Party cells or, where too small, to merge with others. For exam-
ple, in September 2015 the central government issued Notice 51 entitled
‘Opinion on Strengthening Party-building in Social Organizations’. Local
governments soon followed suit. In April 2016 Guangdong Province issued
more detailed guidelines in its Notice 8 on Party-building in social organi-
zations (Shenzhen City Social Organizations Management Bureau, 2017).
These directives were also issued parallel to the drafting of the Foreign
NGOs Law, signalling a tactical move to assert Party control over domestic
social organizations and quash the influence of overseas organizations.
These Notices required social organizations not only to have established
Party cells but also to support the work and activities of Party members.
In September 2016, MOCA issued Notice 257, ‘Notice Concerning Issues
Regarding Building Party Work in Social Organizations at the Time of Reg-
istration’, which formally required social organizations to comply with the
2015 central government Notice 51. In this spirit Shenzhen, a pioneer in
contracting to NGOs, issued a Notice in October 2016 requiring social or-
ganizations to include Party work in their constitutions and to consult with
29. ‘A Decision by the CCP Central Committee on deepening reform of Party and state insti-
tutions’, CCP Central Committee, February 2018. See: www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-
03/05/c_137015953.htm.
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the Party on the organization’s policies, activities, expenditure, donations
and outside engagement.30
These regulations effectively gave Party cells a central panopticon-like
position within social organizations, enabling the monitoring of funds, gath-
ering of information, surveillance of activities, goals and expenditure — a
level of intrusion that had not been experienced previously. Foucault’s sem-
inal work on imprisonment vividly deployed Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon
design to visualize processes of surveillance and power (Foucault, 1977:
195–228; 1991: 206–13). This architectural device allowed the prison guard
to observe the prisoners, who could see neither the inmates of the neigh-
bouring cells nor their watcher (Foucault, 1977: 201–02). The intrusion of
the Party into the life-body of social organizations evokes the metaphor of
the panopticon, though not perfectly as staff can also watch Party members
and members have multiple identities and loyalties. Nevertheless, placing
itself at the centre of the organization, the Party can observe the everyday
working of social organizations, assess risks, monitor staff, volunteers and
visitors and discipline social organizations to deliver information useful for
governing. Moreover, the shrinking opportunities for horizontal networking
amongst social organizations that previously were often funded by interna-
tional donors mean that social organizations are less able to form cross-
regional networks, just as prisoners in the panopticon could not communi-
cate with adjacent cells.
The positioning of the Party at the centre of social organizations poses
risks to the autonomy of the latter to determine goals, objectives, meth-
ods, fundraising and use of funds (Chan and Lei, 2017: 1349–50, 1353).
It enhances the knowledge of the Party/state about registered social orga-
nizations, enabling it to better calculate how best to harness and control
such groups. It also potentially undermines relations of trust with clients,
whose details are shared with the Party/state, and increases control over
social workers. As one social worker in a southern city put it, ‘It’s about
putting the Party first because the Party is afraid social workers will mobi-
lize people’.31 With Party-building inserted into contracts as a performance
indicator, the assessment of social organizations becomes subject to politi-
cal criteria, not just project execution.32 As a social worker commented, ‘If
you are bidding for government contracts, your organization is more com-
petitive if you have a Party cell’.33 Moreover, as another social worker stated
during the same interview, ‘To be a five star NGO, apart from the financial
and professional criteria, you need a well-performing Party cell’.34
30. See Shenzhen City’s Notice regarding promoting social organizations to put Party work into
their constitution (Shenzhen City Social Organizations Management Bureau, 2017).
31. Interview 78, social worker, location C, April 2019.
32. Interviews 75, 76 academics, Interviews 77, 78, social workers, location C, April 2019.
Without a Party cell, a social organization is assessed as normal or below average.
33. Interview 78, social worker, location C, April 2019.
34. Interview 78, social worker, location C, April 2019.
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The increasing importance given to the Party is mirrored in the renam-
ing in 2016 of ‘community comprehensive service centres’ as ‘Party/masses
service centres’ in Guangdong.35 The emphasis on Party leadership has also
put pressure on the priorities of social workers in terms of their client or
Party work. In the words of a social worker, ‘The Party appreciates our hu-
manity and sees it as a good way to relate to the masses. But the purpose
of the work is changing: it’s about the legitimacy of the Party. The Party
takes the credit and sees [NGOs] as useful’.36 However, the picture is varied
as some social organizations see the Party cell as a formality that does not
intrude on their governance or activities. As one staff member stated: ‘This
NGO joined with the mother Party organization from another organization
…but this has no use … it is a requirement to have it’.37 Whilst it is too soon
to assess the overall impact of Party cells on social organizations, their very
presence makes available a tool for monitoring and disciplinary control that
cannot be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the Chinese Party/state pursues an agenda of
enhanced welfare provision through the matrix of community centres, so-
cial workers and social organizations located in the neighbourhood as a way
to maintain social order. The interweaving of political rationalities around
public sector reform, social governance and pluralization of welfare pro-
vides the rationale and moral justification for this approach. Discourses used
to frame thinking around welfare are informed by intersecting bodies of
knowledge such as NPM, social work and Third Sector studies. The con-
tracting of government services to social organizations provides a revealing
lens through which to observe the unfolding of these rationalities at the mi-
cro level. Although the rationalities underpinning welfare service contract-
ing echo neoliberal trends globally, they also overlap with rationalities of
planned socialism in relation to equality, the continued role of the state, al-
beit at a distance, and the reduction of poverty and social injustice. As Sigley
(2006: 503) implies, a hybrid neoliberal-socialist rationality legitimates the
reworked approaches to governance — and, we argue, also to welfarism.
In realizing these new ideas around welfare and governance, the Party/state
has used a range of technologies of statecraft. These include the use of laws
and regulations governing social organizations, social work practice, tech-
niques of inclusion and exclusion, discursive framing of needs and services
35. That is, from shequ zonghe fuwu zhongxin to dangqun fuwu zhongxin. Interview 79, aca-
demic, April 2019.
36. Interview 77, social worker, location C, April 2019.
37. Interview 51, NGO, location D, December 2018.
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over rights and activism, and the panopticon-like Party strengthening within
social organizations.
However, as Foucauldian notions of power assume the possibility of re-
sistance, it should not be concluded that the Party/state is wholly successful
in this undertaking. As observed in this article, social workers find ways to
resist those directives of local government officials which are incompatible
with and/or detract from what they see as their prime responsibilities. Social
organizations, too, find ways to circumvent the intended strictures of govern-
ment contracting, setting up alternative entities to pursue more rights-based
work, pursuing rights-based work without reporting back on it, or finding
alternative ways of funding their work that can preserve their autonomy.
As noted in footnote 3, Party/state officials vary across and within regions,
in their degree of risk aversion and in their circumstances, resource con-
straints, informal rules, and relations with non-state actors, leading to dif-
ferent degrees of enthusiasm and compliance with policy implementation.
Foucauldian micro-analyses of the contracting of welfare services to social
organizations can add fine texture complementing broader, macro-analyses
of power.
Questions remain, however, about the limitations of a Foucauldian ap-
proach to understanding governmentality in authoritarian China and about
the uniqueness of the Chinese experience. For example, juxtaposing pro-
fessionalism against activism may be a way for the government to sort the
chaff from the wheat in terms of social organizations. However, there is an
argument for some professionalization of social organizations in China to
enhance government and public trust in them and improve the effectiveness
of their work. Similarly, as Parton (1999) notes, all states need to prioritize
the allocation of resources and make difficult choices around which services
to support or not. Thus, it is wholly sensible to dedicate considerable re-
sources to, say, elderly care given the demographic phenomenon of ageing
and to prioritize services and professional social organizations with scale
and capacity. Similarly, it can be argued that the commitment to expanding
welfare provision brings benefits to some groups with particular needs and
should not therefore be lightly dismissed. Likewise, the process of govern-
ment contracting, commitment to upscaling and improving the quality of
social organizations could benefit the expansion of civil society. Although
the strategy seeks to institutionalize a divide between service-delivery and
rights-based approaches, the expansion of space might create openings for
rights-oriented groups. In essence, this underlines the fact that power rela-
tions are never settled, never solid and never undisturbed. As Foucault ar-
gued (1991: 60–62, 204–05), power can be both productive and negative.
The key is to understand the strategies, tactics and paths of power and the
opportunities for resistance.
This also raises the question of what is distinctive about China or about
authoritarian regimes engaged in contracting of welfare services through so-
cial organizations. In studies of welfare capitalism, the argument has long
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been made that capitalist governments ensure social order by providing pub-
lic goods and thus appease any demands for systemic change. There is also
a body of work that investigates how and why authoritarian regimes provide
public goods to secure their rule (Cassani, 2017; Croissant and Wurster,
2013). As Leung et al. (2012: 1054) note, there are similarities with the Eu-
ropean context around the role of social work in governmentality. Further-
more, contracting services out to the non-profit and private sector has been
practised for decades in many countries. The Chinese Party/state’s welfare
reforms and its particular strategy of contracting out services echo this neo-
liberal logic.
In reflecting on the differences between the manipulation of welfare in
authoritarian and capitalist regimes, stark divergences include the embed-
ding of the Party-cell panopticon in social organizations as a way of dis-
ciplining them; the limits on the autonomy of social organizations; the se-
vere lack of downward accountability of social workers, local government
officials and social organizations; and the lack of transparency in the con-
tracting process. For the last two points on accountability and transparency,
this is largely a matter of degree, for similar phenomena are to be found in
liberal-democratic contexts. The panopticon phenomenon is reflective of the
more intrusive reach of coercive institutions in authoritarian states. Thus,
whilst capitalism may deploy welfarism as a way of subduing resistance
and revolution, in authoritarian states this instrumentalization has an impor-
tant regime-maintenance dimension with implications for civil society that
should not be overlooked.
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